Judgment of 12 April 1960

The case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India) was referred to the Court by an Application filed on 22 December 1955. In that Application, the Government of Portugal stated that its territory in the Indian Peninsula included two enclaves surrounded by the Territory of India, Dadra and Nagar-Aveli. It was in respect of the communications between those enclaves and the coastal district of Daman, and between each other, that the question arose of a right of passage in favour of Portugal through Indian territory and of a correlative obligation binding upon India. The Application stated that in July 1954 the Government of India prevented Portugal from exercising that right of passage and that Portugal was thus placed in a position in which it became impossible for it to exercise its rights of sovereignty over the enclaves.

Following upon the Application, the Court was seised of six preliminary objections raised by the Government of India. By a Judgment given on 26 November 1957, the Court rejected the first four objections and joined the fifth and sixth objections to the Merits.



In its Judgment, the Court:

(a) rejected the Fifth Preliminary Objection by 13 votes to 2;

(b) rejected the Sixth Preliminary Objection by 11 votes to 4;

(c) found, by 11 votes to 4, that Portugal had in 1954 a right of passage over intervening Indian territory between the enclaves of Dadra and Nagar-Aveli and the coastal district of Daman and between these enclaves, to the extent necessary for the exercise of Portuguese sovereignty over the enclaves and subject to the regulation and control of India, in respect of private persons, civil of officials and goods in general;

(d) found, by 8 votes to 7, that Portugal did not have in 1954 such a right of passage in respect of armed forces, armed police and arms and ammunition;

(e) found, by 9 votes to 6, that India had not acted contrary to its obligations resulting from Portugal’s right of passage in respect of private persons, civil officials and goods in general.

The President and Judges Basdevant, Badawi, Kojevnikov and Spiropoulos appended Declarations to the Judgment of the Court. Judge Wellington Koo appended a Separate Opinion. Judges Winiarski and Badawi appended a Joint Dissenting Opinion. Judges Armand-Ugon, Moreno Quintana and Sir Percy Spender, and Judges ad hoc Chagla and Fernandes, appended Dissenting Opinions.


(a) 第5次予備的異議申立を13票対2で棄却した。

(b) 第6次予備的異議申立を11票対4票で却下した。


(d) 8票対7票の差で、ポルトガルは1954年に軍隊、武装警察、武器弾薬に関してそのような通行権を持っていなかったと判断した。

(e) 9票対6票の差で、インドはポルトガルの私人、文官、一般物品に関する通行権から生じる義務に反する行為をしていないと判断した。

大統領、バスデバン判事、バダウィ判事、コジェフニコフ判事、スピロポロス判事は、裁判所の判決に宣言文を添付した。クー・ウェリントン判事は個別意見を提出しました。Winiarski 裁判官および Badawi 裁判官は、共同反対意見を提出しました。Armand-Ugon判事、Moreno Quintana判事、Sir Percy Spender判事、およびad hoc Chagla判事、Fernandes判事が反対意見を提出しました。

* *

In its Judgment the Court referred to the Submissions filed by Portugal which in the first place requested the Court to adjudge and declare that a right of passage was possessed by Portugal and must be respected by India; this right was invoked by Portugal only to the extent necessary for the exercise of its sovereignty over the enclaves, and it was not contended that passage was accompanied by any immunity and made clear that such passage remained subject to the regulation and control of India, which must be exercised in good faith, India being under an obligation not to prevent the transit necessary for the exercise of Portuguese sovereignty. The Court then considered the date with reference to which it must ascertain whether the right invoked existed or did not exist. The question as to the existence of a right of passage having been put to the Court in respect of the dispute which had arisen with regard to obstacles placed by India in the way of passage, it was the eve of the creation of those obstacles that must be selected as the standpoint from which to certain whether or not such a right existed; the selection of that date would leave open the arguments of India regarding the subsequent lapse of the right of passage.

Portugal next asked the Court to adjudge and declare that India had not complied with the obligations incumbent upon it by virtue of the right of passage. But the Court pointed out that it had not been asked, either in the Application or in the final Submissions of the Parties, to decide whether or not India’s attitude towards those who had instigated the over-throw of Portuguese authority at Dadra and Nagar-Aveli in July and August 1954 constituted a breach of the obligation, said to be binding upon it under general international law, to adopt suitable measures to prevent the incursion of subversive elements into the territory of another State.

Turning then to the future, the Submissions of Portugal requested the Court to decide that India must end the measures by which it opposed the exercise of the right of passage or, if the Court should be of opinion that there should be a temporary suspension of the right, to hold that that suspension should end as soon as the course of events disclosed that the justification for the suspension had disappeared. Portugal had previously invited the Court to hold that the arguments of India concerning its right to adopt an attitude of neutrality, the application of the United Nations Charter and the existence in the enclaves of a local government were without foundation. The Court, however, considered that it was no part of its judicial function to declare in the operative part of its Judgment that any of those arguments was or was not well founded.



* *

Before proceeding to the consideration of the Merits, the Court had to ascertain whether it had jurisdiction to do so, a jurisdiction which India had expressly contested.

In its Fifth Preliminary Objection the Government of India relied upon the reservation in its Declaration of 28 February 1940 accepting the jurisdiction of the Court, which excluded from that jurisdiction disputes with regard to questions which by international law fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of India. The Court pointed out that in the course of the proceedings both Parties had taken their stand on grounds which were on the plane of international law, and had on occasion expressly said so. The fifth objection could not therefore be upheld.

The Sixth Preliminary Objection likewise related to a limitation in the Declaration of 28 February 1940. India, which had accepted the jurisdiction of the Court “over all disputes arising after February 5th, 1930, with regard to situations or facts subsequent to the same date”, contended that the dispute did not satisfy either of these two conditions. As to the first condition, the Court pointed out that the dispute could not have arisen until all its constituent elements had come into existence; among these were the obstacles which India was alleged to have placed in the way of exercise of passage by Portugal in 1954; even if only that part of the dispute relating to the Portuguese claim to a right of passage were to be considered, certain incidents had occurred before 1954, but they had not led the Parties to adopt clearly-defined legal positions as against each other; accordingly, there was no justification for saying that the dispute arose before 1954. As to the second condition, the Permanent Court of International Justice had in 1938 drawn a distinction between the situations or facts which constituted the source of the rights claimed by one of the Parties, and the situations or facts which were the source of the dispute. Only the latter were to be taken into account for the purpose of applying the Declaration. The dispute submitted to the Court was one with regard to the situation of the enclaves, which had given rise to Portugal’s claim to a right of passage and, at the same time, with regard to the facts of 1954 which Portugal advanced as infringements of that right; it was from all of this that the dispute arose, and this whole, whatever may have been the earlier origin of one of its parts, came into existence only after 5 February 1930. The Court had not been asked for any finding whatsoever with regard to the past prior to that date; it was therefore of opinion that the sixth objection should not be upheld and, consequently, that it had jurisdiction.




* *

On the merits, India had contended in the first place that the right of passage claimed by Portugal was too vague and contradictory to enable the Court to pass judgment upon it by the application of the legal rules enumerated in Article 38 (1) of the Statute. There was no doubt that the day-to-day exercise of the right might give rise to delicate questions of application but that was not, in the view of the Court, sufficient ground for holding that the right was not susceptible of judicial determination.

Portugal had relied on the Treaty of Poona of 1779 and on sanads (decrees) issued by the Maratha ruler in 1783 and 1785, as having conferred on Portugal sovereignty over the enclaves with the right of passage to them; India had objected that what was alleged to be the Treaty of 1779 was not validly entered into and never became in law a treaty binding upon the Marathas. The Court, however, found that the Marathas did not at any time cast any doubt upon the validity or binding character of the Treaty. India had further contended that the Treaty and the two sanads did not operate to transfer sovereignty over the assigned villages to Portugal but only conferred, with respect to the villages, a revenue grant. The Court was unable to conclude from an examination of the various texts of the Treaty of 1779 that the language employed therein was intended to transfer sovereignty; the expressions used in the two sanads, on the other hand, established that what was granted to the Portuguese was only a revenue tenure called a jagir or saranjam, and not a single instance had been brought to the notice of the Court in which such a grant had been construed as amounting to a cession of sovereignty. There could, therefore, be no question of any enclave or of any right of passage for the purpose of exercising sovereignty over enclaves.



The Court found that the situation underwent a change with the advent of the British as sovereign of that part of the country in place of the Marathas: Portuguese sovereignty over the villages had been recognized by the British in fact and by implication and had subsequently been tacitly recognized by India. As a consequence the villages had acquired the character of Portuguese enclaves within Indian territory and there had developed between the Portuguese and the territorial sovereign with regard to passage to the enclaves a practice upon which Portugal relied for the purpose of establishing the right of passage claimed by it. It had been objected on behalf of India that no local custom could be established between only two States, but the Court found it difficult to see why the number of States between which a local custom might be established on the basis of long practice must necessarily be larger than two.

It was common ground between the Parties that during the British and post-British periods the passage of private persons and civil officials had not been subject to any restrictions beyond routine control. Merchandise other than arms and ammunition had also passed freely subject only, at certain times, to customs regulations and such regulation and control as were necessitated by considerations of security or revenue. The Court therefore concluded that, with regard to private persons, civil officials and goods in general there had existed a constant and uniform practice allowing free passage between Daman and the enclaves, it was, in view of all the circumstances of the case, satisfied that that practice had been accepted as law by the Parties and had given rise to a right and a correlative obligation.

As regards armed forces, armed police and arms and ammunition, the position was different.




It appeared that, during the British and post-British periods, Portuguese armed forces and armed police had not passed between Daman and the enclaves as of right, and that after 1878 such passage could only take place with previous authorization by the British and later by India, accorded either under a reciprocal arrangement already agreed to, or in individual cases: it had been argued that that permission was always granted, but there was nothing in the record to show that grant of permission was incumbent on the British or on India as an obligation.

A treaty of 26 December 1878 between Great Britain and Portugal had laid down that the armed forces of the two Governments should not enter the Indian dominions of the other, except in specified cases or in consequence of a formal request made by the party desiring such entry. Subsequent correspondence showed that this provision was applicable to passage between Daman and the enclaves: it had been argued on behalf of Portugal that on twenty-three occasions armed forces crossed British territory between Daman and the enclaves without obtaining permission, but in 1890, the Government of Bombay had forwarded a complaint to the effect that armed men in the service of the Portuguese Government were in the habit of passing without formal request through a portion of British territory en route from Daman to Nagar-Aveli which would appear to constitute a breach of the Treaty; on 22 December, the Governor-General of Portuguese India had replied: “Portuguese troops never cross British territory without previous permission”, and the Secretary-General of the Government of Portuguese India stated on 1 May 1891: “On the part of this Government injunctions will be given for the strictest observance of . . . the Treaty”. The requirement of a formal request before passage of armed forces could take place had been repeated in an agreement of 1913. With regard to armed police, the Treaty of 1878 and the Agreement of 1913 had regulated passage on the basis of reciprocity, and an agreement of 1920 had provided that armed police below a certain rank should not enter the territory of the other party without consent previously obtained; finally, an agreement of 1940 concerning passage of Portuguese armed police over the road from Daman to Nagar-Aveli had provided that, if the party did not exceed ten in number, intimation of its passage should be given to the British authorities within twenty-four hours, but that, in other cases, “the existing practice should be followed and concurrence of the British authorities should be obtained by prior notice as heretofore.”

1878年12月26日にイギリスとポルトガルの間で締結された条約では、特定の場合や入国を希望する側からの正式な要請があった場合を除き、両国政府の軍隊は相手国のインド領内に入ってはならないと定められていた。その後のやりとりで、この規定はダマンと飛び地の間の通行にも適用されることがわかった。しかし、1890年にボンベイ政府は、ポルトガル政府に仕える武装した兵士が、ダマンからナガルアベリに向かう途中の英国領の一部を正式な要請なしに通過する習慣があり、これは条約違反であると思われるという内容の苦情を送ってきたので、12月22日にポルトガル領インド総督は次のように回答した。”12月22日、ポルトガル領インド総督は「ポルトガル軍は事前の許可なしに英国領を越えることはない」と答え、ポルトガル領インド政府の事務局長は1891年5月1日に次のように述べている。”1891年5月1日には、ポルトガル・インド政府の事務局長が「この政府の側では、……条約を厳密に遵守するように指示する」と述べている。武装勢力の通過には正式な要請が必要であることは、1913年の協定でも繰り返されている。武装警察については、1878年の条約と1913年の協定では相互主義に基づいて通過を規定し、1920年の協定では、一定の階級以下の武装警察は事前に同意を得ずに相手国の領域に入ってはならないと規定していた。最後に、ダマンからナガルアベリまでの道路をポルトガルの武装警察が通過することに関する1940年の協定では、一行が10人を超えない場合は24時間以内に英国当局に通過の通知をすることが定められていたが、それ以外の場合は「従来の慣行に従うべきであり、これまで通り事前通知により英国当局の同意を得るべきである」とされていた。 “

As regards arms and ammunition, the Treaty of 1878 and rules framed under the Indian Arms Act of 1878 prohibited the importation of arms, ammunition or military stores from Portuguese India and its export to Portuguese India without a special licence. Subsequent practice showed that this provision applied to transit between Daman and the enclaves.

The finding of the Court that the practice established between the Parties had required for the passage of armed forces, armed police and arms and ammunition the permission of the British or Indian authorities rendered it unnecessary for the Court to determine whether or not, in the absence of the practice that actually prevailed, general international custom or general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, which had also been invoked by Portugal, could have been relied upon by Portugal in support of its claim to a right of passage in respect of these categories. The Court was dealing with a concrete case having special features: historically the case went back to a period when, and related to a region in which, the relations between neighbouring States were not regulated by precisely formulated rules but were governed largely by practice: finding a practice clearly established between two States, which was accepted by the Parties as governing the relations between them, the Court must attribute decisive effect to that practice. The Court was, therefore, of the view that no right of passage in favour of Portugal involving a correlative obligation on India had been established in respect of armed forces, armed police and arms and ammunition.



Having found that Portugal had, in 1954, a right of passage in respect of private persons, civil officials and goods in general, the Court lastly proceeded to consider whether India had acted contrary to its obligation resulting from Portugal’s right of passage in respect of any of these categories. Portugal had not contended that India had acted contrary to that obligation before July 1954, but it complained that passage was thereafter denied to Portuguese nationals of European origin, to native Indian Portuguese in the employ of the Portuguese Government and to a delegation that the Governor of Daman proposed, in July 1954, to send to Nagar-Aveli and Dadra. The Court found that the events which had occurred in Dadra on 21-22 July 1954 and which had resulted in the overthrow of Portuguese authority in that enclave had created tension in the surrounding Indian district, having regard to that tension, the Court was of the view that India’s refusal of passage was covered by its power of regulation and control of the right of passage of Portugal.

For these reasons, the Court reached the findings indicated above.














民法問題いろいろ 1404

1404 - 民法問題いろいろ 1404



民法 第九章 質権    第一節 総則
第三百四十六条  質権は、元本、利息、違約金、質権の実行の費用、質物の保存の費用及び債務の不履行又は質物の隠れた瑕疵によって生じた損害の賠償を担保する。ただし、設定行為に別段の定めがあるときは、この限りでない。

第三百九十八条の二  抵当権は、設定行為で定めるところにより、一定の範囲に属する不特定の債権を極度額の限度において担保するためにも設定することができる。
2  前項の規定による抵当権(以下「根抵当権」という。)の担保すべき不特定の債権の範囲は、債務者との特定の継続的取引契約によって生ずるものその他債務者との一定の種類の取引によって生ずるものに限定して、定めなければならない。
3  特定の原因に基づいて債務者との間に継続して生ずる債権又は手形上若しくは小切手上の請求権は、前項の規定にかかわらず、根抵当権の担保すべき債権とすることができる。
01 - 民法問題いろいろ 1404





第三百五十一条  他人の債務を担保するため質権を設定した者は、その債務を弁済し、又は質権の実行によって質物の所有権を失ったときは、保証債務に関する規定に従い、債務者に対して求償権を有する。

催告は 第四款 第一目 総則 保証債務に関するもので抵当権ではない。連帯保証人以外の保証人ができること。
第四百五十二条  債権者が保証人に債務の履行を請求したときは、保証人は、まず主たる債務者に催告をすべき旨を請求することができる。ただし、主たる債務者が破産手続開始の決定を受けたとき、又はその行方が知れないときは、この限りでない。

第三百八十五条  第三百八十三条各号に掲げる書面の送付を受けた債権者は、前条第一号の申立てをするときは、同号の期間内に、債務者及び抵当不動産の譲渡人にその旨を通知しなければならない。



第三百九十八条の四  元本の確定前においては、根抵当権の担保すべき債権の範囲の変更をすることができる。債務者の変更についても、同様とする。
2  前項の変更をするには、後順位の抵当権者その他の第三者の承諾を得ることを要しない。
3  第一項の変更について元本の確定前に登記をしなかったときは、その変更をしなかったものとみなす。

第三百七十六条  抵当権者は、その抵当権を他の債権の担保とし、又は同一の債務者に対する他の債権者の利益のためにその抵当権若しくはその順位を譲渡し、若しくは放棄することができる。
2  前項の場合において、抵当権者が数人のためにその抵当権の処分をしたときは、その処分の利益を受ける者の権利の順位は、抵当権の登記にした付記の前後による。

第三百九十八条の十一  元本の確定前においては、根抵当権者は、第三百七十六条第一項の規定による根抵当権の処分をすることができない。ただし、その根抵当権を他の債権の担保とすることを妨げない。
2  第三百七十七条第二項の規定は、前項ただし書の場合において元本の確定前にした弁済については、適用しない。

民法の問題色々 1403




民法第七章 時効 第二節 取得時効
第百六十二条  二十年間、所有の意思をもって、平穏に、かつ、公然と他人の物を占有した者は、その所有権を取得する。
2  十年間、所有の意思をもって、平穏に、かつ、公然と他人の物を占有した者は、その占有の開始の時に、善意であり、かつ、過失がなかったときは、その所有権を取得する。



第百四十五条  時効は、当事者が援用しなければ、裁判所がこれによって裁判をすることができない。
第百六十七条  債権は、十年間行使しないときは、消滅する。
2  債権又は所有権以外の財産権は、二十年間行使しないときは、消滅する。



最高裁判決 平成13年11月27日

(1) 事案の概要
 第一審(浦和地判 平成9年4月25日)は、Xの請求を斥け、控訴審(東京高判 平成9年12月11日)では、時効による権利の消滅は、買主に瑕疵を発見すべき義務を負わせるに等しく、公平ではないとしてXの請求を一部認容した。

(2) 判決の要旨











第四百十四条  債務者が任意に債務の履行をしないときは、債権者は、その強制履行を裁判所に請求することができる。ただし、債務の性質がこれを許さないときは、この限りでない。
2  債務の性質が強制履行を許さない場合において、その債務が作為を目的とするときは、債権者は、債務者の費用で第三者にこれをさせることを裁判所に請求することができる。ただし、法律行為を目的とする債務については、裁判をもって債務者の意思表示に代えることができる。
3  不作為を目的とする債務については、債務者の費用で、債務者がした行為の結果を除去し、又は将来のため適当な処分をすることを裁判所に請求することができる。
4  前三項の規定は、損害賠償の請求を妨げない。







第四百十六条  債務の不履行に対する損害賠償の請求は、これによって通常生ずべき損害の賠償をさせることをその目的とする。
2  特別の事情によって生じた損害であっても、当事者がその事情を予見し、又は予見することができたときは、債権者は、その賠償を請求することができる。



民法の問題いろいろ 1402


A.間違い 追認はさかのぼって効力を生ずる(民法116条)









1 代理権は、次に掲げる事由によって消滅する。
2 委任による代理権は、前項各号に掲げる事由のほか、委任の終了によって消滅する。







宅地建物 主任者 建物の構造と特製

13 建物
  木造 ブロック造 鉄骨造 鉄筋コンクリ 鉄骨鉄筋コンクリ  
2階 3階 高層 中高層 高層 階数
40年 60年 60年 80年 100年
鉄筋コンクリ 鉄筋コンクリート造は熱に弱く変形しやすいがコンクリは熱に強い
鉄骨鉄筋コンクリ さらに鉄骨が加われば鬼に金棒
メモ 木造の繊維方向に直行する方向の圧縮の材料強度は、繊維方向の圧縮の強度よりも小さい


出題回数 土地と建物
17 宅地に適してない土地 土地 特徴
台地や丘陵地の周辺部 集中豪雨等でがけ崩れ
低地 洪水、地震等自然災害に弱い
自然堤防や盛土等に囲まれた低地、干拓地 地盤が軟弱、低湿で特に災害を受けやすい
河川沿い、埋立地 地下水位が高く、軟弱な地盤が堆積、液状化現象が起きやすい
旧河道 地盤が軟弱
低地:扇状地、 自然堤防、 砂丘 、 古い天井川等の微高地 は 比較的危険性が高い
土地 必要な措置
建築物の敷地 雨水、や汚水を輩出し、または処理する為の下水管、下水溝、溜桝 等の施設を講じなければならない
湿潤な土地、出水の多い土地、ゴミで埋め立てられた土地 盛土、地番の改良 その他 衛生上 又は 安全上必要な措置を講じなければならない
がけ崩れ等に被害のある場合 擁壁設置その他安全上適当な措置を講じなければならない
土地 措置
切土後の地盤に滑りやすい土質の層があるとき 杭打ち、土の置き換えなど
切土または盛土後の断面 擁護壁で覆うか植生等による保護
著しい傾斜地への盛土 盛土の接する面が滑りやすいので段切りその他の方法
開発区域内の地盤が軟弱 土の置き換え、水抜き



本人から頼まれて代理人として契約することを 任意代理 となり代理権授与されています。

問題 保護者等が本人の法律で補えない行為をすることは 任意代理である。


答え:× 法定代理

問題 売主Aと買主Bの契約時に本人Aに代わって自分が代理人であることを伝えずBと契約したCの行為は、本人AとBが契約したことになる。



答え × 代理人と伝えなければ、本人AとBとの契約は成立せず、BとC当事者同士の契約となる。



善意 = 知らないこと、 悪意 = 知ってること
過失 = うっかり 、 無過失 = うっかりではない



出題回数 建築物の種類 用途 第1種低層 第2種低層 第1種中高層 第2種中高層 第1種住居 第2種住居 準住居 近隣商業 商業 準工業 工業 工業専用
住宅 住宅、共同住宅、寄宿舎
5 兼用住宅 店舗、事務所50㎡以下
養護 老人ホーム障害者福祉ホーム
宗教 神社、寺、教会
保育所 保育所、風呂屋、診療所
3 派出所 派出所、公衆電話
福祉 老人福祉センター、児童厚生施設 600㎡以下◯ 600㎡以下◯
図書館等 図書館、博物館
小学校 幼稚園、小中高学校
7 大学 大学、専門専修学校
病院 病院
小店舗 150㎡以下の店舗 D
中店舗 150㎡超~500㎡以下 D
2 大店舗 上記以外の販売飲食店舗 B C E E E D
事務所 上記以外の事務所 B C
教習所 自動車教習所、15㎡超の畜舎 C
遊技場 水泳、ボーリング、スケート場 C
7 ホテル ホテル、旅館 C
カラオケ カラオケボックス E E
ギャンブル パチンコ、麻雀、馬券売り場 E E
小娯楽場 客席200㎡未満の劇場映画館演芸場
大娯楽場 客席200㎡以上の劇場映画館演芸場
5 キャバレー キャバレー、クラブ、料理店、ダンスホール
個室風呂 ソープランド
出題回数 建築物の種類 用途 第1種低層 第2種低層 第1種中高層 第2種中高層 第1種住居 第2種住居 準住居 近隣商業 商業 準工業 工業 工業専用
0 小車庫 2F以下300㎡以下の自動車車庫
大車庫 3F以上又は300㎡超の自動車車庫営業用倉庫
少修理 150㎡以下の自動車修理工場
3 中修理 150㎡超~300㎡以下自動車修理工場、日刊新聞の印刷所
小工場 50㎡以下の危険性環境悪化が非常に低い工場
中工場 50㎡超~150㎡以下の危険性環境悪化が低い工場
大工場 150㎡超の危険性環境悪化が多い工場
危険工場 危険性大又は環境悪化のおそれ
2 小危険施設 火薬石油ガス等の貯蔵処理が非常に少ない B C
中危険施設 火薬石油ガス等の貯蔵処理が少ない
大危険施設 火薬石油ガス等の貯蔵処理がやや多い
超危険施設 火薬石油ガス等の貯蔵処理が多い
火葬場等 火葬場、と畜場、卸売市場、汚染処理場 都市計画による位置等の決定を要する
B 2F以下 且つ 1500㎡以下は建築可 D 物品販売、飲食店は建築不可
C 3000㎡以下は建築可 E 10000㎡以下は建築可